Neg – Solvency
Transparency Bad

*Transparency can lead to conflict through identification of hostility and weakness.*

**Lord 6** (Kristin Lord, held leadership roles at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs including Associate Dean for Strategy, Research, and External Relations and Associate Dean for Management and Planning, “The Perils and Promise of Global Transparency Why the Information Revolution May Not Lead to Security, Democracy, or Peace,” p. 24)

Unfortunately, transparency is a double-edged sword. Though transparency does reduce uncertainty, less uncertainty will not always mean more security or peace. Rather, the effects of greater transparency depend on what it shows and how states react. We cannot assume that transparency will show behavior that supports peace and cooperation or that states will react to information in ways that will lead to a more just or peaceful world. Greater transparency can indeed enhance international peace and security if it shows that other states are genuinely peace-loving, but transparency can make conflicts worse if it illuminates hostility, aggression, or arms buildups. By illuminating weakness, transparency can undermine deterrence and encourage aggression. It can alert states to closing windows of opportunities and give them incentives to fight. By taking away strategic ambiguity, transparency can encourage states to find less visible, more pernicious means of defending their interests.

**It’s an impact magnifier**

**Lord 6** (Kristin Lord, held leadership roles at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs including Associate Dean for Strategy, Research, and External Relations and Associate Dean for Management and Planning, “The Perils and Promise of Global Transparency Why the Information Revolution May Not Lead to Security, Democracy, or Peace,” p.32)

Greater transparency also makes states less secure if it shows that states are aggressive, greedy, or seek to maximize their power. Just as transparency can illuminate peaceful intentions, it can emphasize hostility and a willingness to fight. In such cases, transparency acts as a megaphone that amplifies belligerent rhetoric and exacerbates conflicts. When hostile rhetoric is widely heard, rhetoric can build on itself and reduce the number of politically acceptable options short of the use of force. In contrast to many liberal arguments, such rhetoric comes not just from leaders who will benefit from war, but also from mass publics. War can be popular and several cases, such as the Spanish-American War, illustrate that the general public can desire war even more than leaders and can pressure reluctant governments to fight. When domestic politics makes it difficult for politicians to defuse a crisis, transparency may constrain the options of negotiators and limit the political space available for peaceful conflict resolution. Transparency exacerbates conflicts if it shows that there is public support for war and may be particularly dangerous when it shows that there is widespread animosity toward some other nation or “out-group,” which can heighten perceived threats and exacerbate conflicts.

Aggressive nationalism is not limited to authoritarian states. Indeed, because democracies tend to be the most transparent of states, they may also send the most belligerent signals when roused. Democracies do not usually fight each other, but strong evidence indicates that democracies fight wars at least as much as other types of states. Classical liberals like Immanuel Kant, failed to predict this phenomenon, believing that states ruled by the people whose lives and treasure would be lost by war, would also be the most pacific. But, historically, war is often popular in democracies. Publics may support war even more than their leaders, thus constraining efforts at peaceful resolution of a
conflict. Democratizing states may be the most dangerous of all. When publics are able to express nationalism that authoritarian regimes suppressed, the results may be a more aggressive foreign policy.

Informal dialogues backfire, legal codification and dispute resolution mechanisms are a key component - confusion and self-serving interpretation

Ghallager 14 (Nancy Gallagher is the Interim Director at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy. She was the Executive Director of the Clinton administration’s Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Task Force and worked with the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on recommendations to build bipartisan support for U.S. ratification. She has been an arms control specialist in the State Department, a Foster Fellow in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a faculty member at Wesleyan University. “Rethinking U.S.-China Security Cooperation”. Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. August 2014 http://www.cissm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/Rethinking%20US-China%20Security%20Cooperation%20-%20082714.pdf) CTD **TCBM = Trust and Confidence Building Measure

Dialogue, transparency, and voluntary CBMs can be sufficient when misperceptions are the sole cause of a security problem. But they can increase tension when what states are saying, showing, or doing confirms the existence of serious conflicts of interest over which they are willing and able to fight if some red line is crossed. Even when neither side has aggressive intentions and both understand that war would be an irrational way to advance most policy objectives, making TCBMs the centerpiece of efforts to promote security cooperation can backfire. Because the United States and China both have good reasons not to show and tell each other everything about their military capabilities and plans, using the other side’s rejection of a particular TCBM you have proposed as a “litmus test” of its intentions can be misleading. It may look like the proposer wants to cooperate while the rejector does not, when neither country might really be interested in meaningful cooperation. Or they both might be, but have very different ideas of where to begin. Likewise, norms and codes of conduct can be used to reduce uncertainty, increase predictability, and minimize misperceptions when there is widespread agreement about the distinction between appropriate behavior versus actions that are irresponsible, reckless, illegitimate or aggressive. But when they are not clearly defined, legally codified, and supported by agreed mechanisms for verifying compliance and resolving compliance disputes, there is much room for confusion, self-serving interpretation, and disregard of “soft law” obligations when following those rules would be inconvenient. For example, in discussing territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea, Secretary of State Kerry framed the core question as: “whether might makes right or whether global rules and norms and rule of (international) law will prevail.” Yet, parties on both sides of the disputes can invoke international principles and precedents in support of their claim, while accusing the other side of intimidation, provocation, and attempts to change the ‘facts on the ground’ in their favor. The only concrete examples Kerry gave for how the conflicts might be deescalated and resolved diplomatically involved a 2002 Declaration of Conduct developed by ASEAN, a regional forum that does not include China, and arbitration under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, a treaty which the United States has not ratified. Even when there is near universal international agreement that some action is wrong, like sending troops to seize part of a neighbor’s territory, such shared understandings won’t keep leaders from doing whatever they calculate is in their national self-interest to do unless they care more about the general importance of upholding community norms than about whatever they might gain by breaking a particular rule, or lose by enforcing it.
Military transparency isn't needed and is counterproductive.

Chen 14 (Ding-Ding, Assistant professor of government at University of Macau, "Military Transparency is Overrated" available: http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/military-transparency-is-overrated/ The Diplomat, accessed: 6/25/2016) KAB

One often-heard complaint about China’s military development is its lack of military transparency. During U.S. Defense Secretary Hagel’s recent visit to China, he again raised this issue to his Chinese counterpart. Actually it is misleading to say that China has not made efforts to increase its military transparency (see here and here); it is just that the U.S. side feels like China has not done enough to make itself transparent. Commentators have also debated over why there is a lack of transparency in China’s military buildup. According to Chinese scholars, the reasons why China’s military is not transparent enough include the following: 1) **transparency is a result of trust and thus what is more important** is to build mutual trust between China and the U.S.; 2) the lack of transparency is a way to protect China against a much stronger rival in the U.S. military and it is unfair to ask the weak side to be equally transparent or even more transparent; 3) **being secretive is part of Chinese strategic culture and it cannot change very quickly.** The last point is especially interesting because China’s lack of military transparency is not just aimed at foreign countries; China’s domestic public has very limited access to its own military development and many have criticized this. Although in general more transparency and openness are good when it comes to assessing a country’s strategic intentions, there is also a tendency among commentators to overvalue military transparency. We should keep in mind that **increased military transparency does not clearly signal strategic intentions.** For example, Russia is arguably more transparent in its military spending and activities than China is, but this didn’t stop Russia from invading Georgia in 2008 and annexing Crimea in 2014. Some might argue that Russia’s military is not transparent enough, but this misses the point. **Strategic intentions are key, and intentions can change regardless of how transparent one’s military is. Pushing China to be more or completely transparent in its military development can be unrealistic and even counterproductive.** No country would be completely transparent about its military development, as doing so would reveal its military vulnerabilities and thus pose a threat to its national security. The U.S. is no exception in this. Moreover, with a high level of distrust between the two sides, the U.S. will not be reassured even if China is completely transparent about its military development. Then the Chinese side would complain that no matter what they do the U.S. will not trust them and that the U.S. itself is not transparent enough. In short, **military transparency is unlikely to prevent the U.S. and China from getting into a serious conflict;** but **strategic restraint or mutually assured restraint from both sides can.**

The key idea is that China as a rising power and the U.S. as a dominant power will not fall into the Thucydides Trap which has been emphasized by both Chinese and American leaders in recent talks (here and here). What is really interesting about this position paper is that it provides a list of issues that require restraint from both sides. For example, it calls for no use of force to change the status quo, including regime change and territorial disputes. It also calls for creative solutions to territorial disputes such as sharing sovereignty. Moreover, it calls for mutual respect for each other’s political and economic systems. The Chinese side seems to welcome this proposal, although it is too early to establish institutionalized mechanisms. However, ultimately whether such ideas will be accepted by both China and the U.S. will be determined by shifting balance of power and domestic politics in both countries.
Neg – China-SoKo Relations Advantage
China Accepts THAAD—Doesn’t Destroy Relations


China’s top diplomat says Beijing has “legitimate national security” concerns over the potential deployment of an advanced U.S. missile shield to South Korea in response to growing nuclear provocations from North Korea — but Chinese leaders also respect that it will be up to Seoul to “make a final decision” on the matter. The comments by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Washington on Thursday were a departure from Beijing’s long-held and aggressive resistance to the idea that Seoul might allow the U.S. to position the so-called Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. “The United States is likely to deploy THAAD in the [South Korea],” Mr. Wang said. “Of course, it’s up to the [South Korean] government to make a final decision. To some extent, it’s their internal affair and China does not interfere in internal affairs of other countries.” His remarks came a day after South Korean officials warned Beijing not to try and bully Seoul out of accepting the missile system. “This is a matter we will decided upon according to our own security and national interests,” Jung Youn-kuk, a spokesman for South Korean President Park Geun-hye said on Wednesday. “The Chinese had better recognize that.”
Even with ROK-China Cooperation, Cross-Border Pollution Ensure an Increase in Air Pollution

Canada 13 (Government of Canada, 2013, “Cross Border Air Pollution in Asia”)

Cross-border pollution has become increasingly common in Asia as the world’s factories and agro-forestry projects grow and cluster in manufacturing and resource-intensive regions in China, India, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries. Two main sources of cross-border pollution in Asia are: 1) carbon emissions from fuel combustion in energy production and heavy industry and 2) transboundary haze from the burning of forests for agricultural needs. China is by far the largest emitter of carbon dioxide from fuel combustion - not only in Asia but in the world - responsible for about a quarter of the world’s total CO2 emissions at 9.86 gigatons (Gt). This is more than five times the CO2 emissions of India (1.97 Gt) and Japan (1.32 Gt). Indonesia is another major emitter in Asia with the majority of its emissions stemming from slash-and-burn land clearing and palm oil production. Why is it important? Reports of downwind air pollution are becoming more prevalent as air quality standards continue to deteriorate in East and Southeast Asia, causing significant public tensions both within and amongst affected Asian countries. Besides instigating widespread protests across the country, emissions from China’s largely coal-fuelled energy production and manufacturing sectors have also sparked outrage in Japan and South Korea. Slash-and-burn land clearance and palm oil production in Indonesia have spread smog to neighbouring Malaysia and Singapore. When air pollution disperses across borders, the problem broadens beyond local concerns about eco-conservation and public health to provoke regional and international debate about climate change and responsible governance of global commons. There is a strong push for countries to take responsibility for limiting or reducing their domestic emissions, as well to collaborate to address crossborder pollution. How does it impact Asia? The impact on cross-border air pollution has already created a strain on relations between countries in Asia as a result of resource competition and resource management, or in some cases, mismanagement. In Indonesia, insufficient government response to the haze crisis in June 2013 has evoked anger from local farmers as well as neighbouring Singaporeans, where air pollution levels have soared to unprecedented levels. Singapore’s Ministry of Health implemented a five-month Haze Subsidy Scheme to subsidize medical fees for Singaporeans seeking treatment for haze-related conditions at designated clinics. Political tensions between Indonesia and Singapore concerning the transboundary haze issue have prompted Singaporean authorities to consider taking legal action against companies in Indonesia that have violated local bushburning laws. While Indonesia does have laws against bush burning, they are not strictly monitored or enforced.
Corruption Trumps Pollution, Undermines CCP Legitimacy

Bell 15 (Daniel Bell is a Professor of Philosophy and Culture at Tsinghua University, 4-19-15, Huffington Post, "Why China’s Leaders See Corruption as a Mortal Threat", http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-a-bell/china-corruption-threat_b_6699410.html)

Like many workplaces in China, my department does not draw strict lines between professional responsibilities and social life. I’ve been teaching political theory at Tsinghua University in Beijing for over a decade, and the department organizes a yearly talent festival for students and teachers. The aim is not just to showcase talent — singing, comedy skits and so on — but also to generate a sense of community and commitment among participants. This year, we canceled the talent festival. We were told to refrain from any activities that might give the appearance of misuse of public funds. To my mind, it seems like an excessive reaction to President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. But it does show how the campaign has upended just about every corner of work life in China. As everybody knows by now, corruption — the abuse of public office for private gain — is a serious problem in China. Upon assuming power, President Xi recognized that corruption threatens the stability of the entire political system and he has made combating corruption the government’s top priority. Such worries have been expressed by political leaders in the past. Former President Hu Jintao warned that corruption “could prove fatal to the party, and even cause the collapse of the party and the fall of the state,” and his predecessor Jiang Zemin said that “corruption is the cancer in the body of the party and the state. If we let it be, our party, our political power and our socialist modernization cause will be doomed.” It’s worth asking why China’s leaders are so worried about corruption. After all, corruption is also problem for other large developing countries such as India and Indonesia. Moreover, corruption in China is less harmful to economic development than corruption elsewhere. As economist Jagdish Bhagwati put it, India’s corruption “is classic ‘rent-seeking,’ where people jostle to grab a cut of existing wealth. ‘The Chinese have what I call profit-sharing corruption’: the Communist party puts a straw into the milkshake so ‘they have an interest in having the milkshake grow larger.’” Yet political leaders in India and Indonesia do not worry that the whole political system is under threat of collapse. The same goes for the United States in the late 19th and 20th century, when it had high levels of corruption. Sure, corruption was viewed as a serious problem, but not as a stake in the heart of the system. After all, the best way to deal with corruption is to develop the economy. At some stage, countries reach a level of GDP per capita where ordinary, non-corrupt economic activity is sufficient to fulfill basic needs. In the East Asian region, empirical studies show that control of corruption improves along with level of economic development. Within China, wealthier parts such as Shanghai tend to be less corrupt than poor areas in the rural hinterland. So why not just wait a few decades when (assuming an optimistic economic growth scenario) China will have become a wealthy country? Put differently, why are Chinese leaders so worried about corruption now? The timing of the anti-corruption campaign is related to the scale and visibility of the problem. The overall level of corruption has exploded over the past three decades, and it has become a visible political problem the past few years due to the glare of social media and more conspicuous consumption by political elites. The main reason for worry in China is related to the political system. In a democracy, leaders get their legitimacy from being chosen by the people, and the people can change their leaders in the next election if they aren’t satisfied. If the next batch of leaders are still corrupt, to a certain extent the people need to blame themselves. Corruption in a democracy doesn’t mean the political system is not democratic. In contrast, China prides itself on being a political meritocracy that selects and promotes leaders with superior ability and virtue. The value of meritocracy is central to Chinese political culture and studies show that ordinary Chinese expect their leaders to be virtuous, meaning that rulers are supposed to use power to serve the political community, not themselves. The higher the level of political corruption, the less meritocratic the political system. Hence, the regime will lack legitimacy if its leaders are seen to be corrupt. Chinese leaders are not wrong to think corruption is a mortal threat to the whole political system. Corruption undermines not just the legitimacy of the Communist Party, but the aim of building a political meritocracy composed of public-spirited rulers. Such views are not mere theoretical speculation: the CCP won the hearts and minds of most Chinese people in its civil war with the KMT because it was perceived to be far less corrupt. From regime survival point of view, it is indeed alarming that corruption in mainland China seems to have reached levels similar to those of pre-revolutionary China under KMT rule. Over the past two decades, most dissatisfaction in
China was directed at corruption by lower-level officials, but the Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang cases point to rot at the top that more directly threatens the foundations of the political system. The same goes for reports by foreign media that unveiled the extravagant fortunes accumulated by family members of China’s top political elite. The Chinese government reacted by closing down some websites of “unfriendly” media, but such stopgap measures can only postpone the day of reckoning. In short, it is clear that meritocratically selected leaders have more incentive to clean up corruption than democratically elected leaders because regime survival depends on it.

Empirics Prove-- Corruption Undermines CCP Legitimacy
Pei 2007 (Minxin Pei is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2007, “Corruption Threatens China’s Future”, Policy Brief 55)

With its economy soaring at around 10 percent a year for nearly three decades, China’s ascendance seems unstoppable. High savings, integration into the global economy, and private entrepreneurship are expected to power Chinese economic growth for years to come. Behind China’s dynamism, however, lurk many dangers that could derail the Middle Kingdom’s reemergence as a great power: environmental degradation, population aging, rising inequality, a tattered social safety net, and, above all, endemic corruption. Combating corruption is perhaps one of the toughest tasks ahead because it requires politically difficult reforms so far eschewed by Beijing for fear of undermining the supremacy of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). But without intensifying its fight against official corruption, the Chinese government runs many serious risks. The experiences of other developing countries show that runaway corruption undermines critical governing institutions, fuels public resentment, exacerbates socioeconomic inequality, creates massive economic distortions, and magnifies the risks of full-blown crises. The failure to contain official corruption will inevitably endanger China’s economic development.

Income Inequality Undermines CCP Legitimacy
Mckay 2006 (Evan Mckay is a Graduate Student in the International Studies Program at DePaul University, 2006, Illinois State, “Governance and Legitimization in China: The Globalization Dilemna”)

Beyond the information revolution, globalization is also linked to China’s growing problem of uneven economic growth and income disparity. Under Mao egalitarianism had been a fundamental characteristic of the communist ideology, which makes disparity a particularly sensitive challenge for the CCP. 27 As Manuel Castells has argued, economic globalization tends to create winners and losers, or a “pattern of segmentation.” 28 In China, the winners have been those with access to new technology and foreign capital. This has primarily benefited the entrepreneurial classes along the coast. According to a United Nations-funded survey by three Chinese economists, “there exist significant differences in the pace and extent of globalization across regions.” 29 They expect this disparate globalization to substantially increase regional income disparity. 7 Numbers suggest that these predictions are already coming to fruition. The Gini coefficient – what economists use to measure income disparity within an economy – has risen from .33 in 1980 to .46 in 2000. 30 This means that a smaller number of people are now controlling a much larger portion of the national income. What makes this form of inequality troubling for China is that is has such a clear regional pattern. According to the UN-sponsored report, the coastal provinces receive nearly eight times as much foreign investment as the rest of the country combined. 31 Even the Party-controlled press like the People’s Daily has called attention to the situation: “The crisis has become too serious for us to ignore.” 32 China’s regional income disparity has been attributed to several developments. First, as Tipson argues, access to the information revolution and all of the economic advantages it offers has been limited to the coastal engines of growth, creating a “stratified and compartmentalized society.” 33 Dali Yang, in his book Beyond Beijing, suggests that “preferential policies for the coastal regions” have expanded the technological advantages already built into the system. 34 Others, like David Dollar and Aart Kraay, blame access to education or other social services. 35 The UN report concludes that all of these factors are relevant, but that globalization is the only factor that is “rising over time.” 36 The growing income gap in China poses a challenge to the CCP’s governance-based legitimacy for a few reasons. First, as Yang suggests, regional disparity tends to be selfsustaining: “In a sense, the less developed areas in China are caught in a vicious circle of backwardness.” 37 In the provinces where globalization has not yet produced dramatic economic growth, there are rarely enough resources or talented officials to implement reforms that might rectify the problem. Perhaps more troubling, those marginalized by globalization are also those...
who had been the foundation of Maoist ideology: peasants and rural workers. Over time, frustration and unrest within China’s interior could pose a significant threat to Party legitimacy. As the regional income gap has grown, migration from rural to urban areas has become another troubling issue for Chinese governance. Dorothy Solinger has explained how the income gap has brought millions of displaced rural workers to the coastal cities in search of employment. This “floating population” challenges the Chinese state’s traditional controls of population and travel by ignoring the hukou or household registration system. The state has no effective way of counting these migrant workers; to manage or support them is out of the question entirely. In essence, regional disparity has led to an internal migration problem similar to the illegal immigration situation in the United States: millions of displaced rural workers have flooded the Eastern coastal cities, with little government support or accountability. The CCP has taken some cautious steps to reduce the regional income gap, but so far they have been largely unsuccessful. Efforts to reform and expand the social safety net have proven complicated. Even providing low-income housing, education, and health care has proven extraordinarily difficult for the party leadership. A demographic study of hukou mobility has shown that when rural migrants have been granted urban classification, their access to education, employment, and other social services has been dramatically improved. Unfortunately, this survey also reveals that only a tiny minority of rural migrants has achieved hukou mobility – largely thanks to political ties with the local governments. A recent editorial from the People’s Daily called for a national income tax and expanding tax breaks to rural households, which probably indicates the direction China’s top leaders intend to move on the issue. Yet, even overhauling the tax or social security structure is unlikely to remove the fundamental obstacles to a more equal development in China. As Dali Yang argues: “The dominance of coastal interest in Chinese politics is unlikely to be significantly altered without 9 fundamentally transforming the mechanisms of governance.” While such a transformation seems unlikely, the alternative for the CCP may be crisis of legitimacy. The editorial in the People’s Daily reveals how much is at stake for China’s current leaders: “In the next five years, it is expected that the central leadership will be able to demonstrate how effective it is in tackling these challenges and fulfilling political promises.” Clearly, how the CCP manages the governance dilemma of income disparity is linked to the legitimacy of the regime as a whole. Failure to at least improve the situation could create enormous political pressure from those who have been left out of the globalization boom. While the Chinese leadership seems aware of this dilemma, so far it has accepted growing income disparity as long as the national income has grown. Should the globalization boom slow down, however, trouble may follow.

Information Revolution Undermines CCP Legitimacy

Mckay 2006 (Evan Mckay is a Graduate Student in the International Studies Program at DePaul University, 2006, Illinois State, “Governance and Legitimization in China: The Globalization Dilemma”)

While the Chinese government correctly views the growth of information and telecommunications technology as a key to future economic growth, it also presents a key challenge to CCP legitimacy. Tony Saich explains that the information revolution and the internet in particular threaten the CCP’s “monopoly over the flow of information.” As globalization has opened new venues for communication within China and with the outside world, the Party is no longer capable of limiting the public discourse away from criticism or “corrupt” topics like democracy or Tibetan independence. This development has led scholars like Barrett McCormick and Qing Liu to suggest that it offers “the potential to establish a more open and reasonable public sphere.” There is some evidence that public opinion from the internet and from a freer press is putting pressure on the Chinese leadership. In 2001, then-Premier Zhu Rongji was forced to issue a public apology when a government-sponsored coverup of an explosion in a rural schoolhouse was exposed by the Hong Kong press and spread via internet message boards. Johan Lagerqvist has suggested that internet public opinion has “influenced the verdicts of court judges, party officials, and the news agenda in traditional media types.” The danger for the CCP is that if its “information autarchy” is unsustainable, its political legitimacy might be in jeopardy as well. Aware of this risk, the government has taken some considerable measures to rein in the information revolution and control the “corrupting” influence of foreign media. Thus, China has at various times blocked foreign news websites such as CNN and the Wall Street Journal along with politically sensitive organizations like
Amnesty International and the Taiwanese government. 22 Other governance attempts have included flooding the internet with Party- or government-sponsored websites, 23 widely publicizing arrests of dissidents who have posted democratic sentiments, 24 and screening bulletin boards and chat rooms. 25

Accession to International Norms Undermines CCP Legitimacy

Mckay 2006 (Evan Mckay is a Graduate Student in the International Studies Program at DePaul University, 2006, Illinois State, “Governance and Legitimization in China: The Globalization Dilemna”)

44 In joining the international community, the CCP has also been willing to allow its traditional governance methods to change, presenting some additional challenges to legitimacy. Margaret Pearson has explained how China’s accession to international norms and regimes within trade and investment has forced the CPP to alter not only its policies, but also its 10 basic institutions. 45 This has included adapting the domestic financial bureaucracy to global standards, implementing bank and accounting reform, and planning a slew of measures to gain entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). 46 Likewise, Nicholas Lardy has argued that in order to gain financing and support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, China has accepted counseling from these organizations in shaping monetary policy and liberalizing the domestic capital market. 47 By far the most important challenge for China’s governance system has come from accession and membership in the WTO. Under former-President Jiang Zemin, China entered negotiations with the United States to gain entry into the global trading regime. Since an agreement was reached in 1999, China has undergone a series of fundamental governance reforms to meet the membership requirements. In his book Reforming the Chinese Leviathan, Dali Yang examines many of these reforms. He concludes that “as China has become more deeply integrated into and dependent on the global economy, its behavior has also become more ‘normalized.’” 48 Yang examines numerous ways in which the CCP has forsaken sovereignty and pushed through complicated reforms under the pretense that the WTO required them: legal system reform, state divestiture from business, and cautious government procurement of agricultural products. 49 China’s accession to international norms and regimes raises some important challenges to legitimacy. First, many of these organizations have required the Chinese state to cede parts of its sovereignty upwards, releasing the CCP’s stranglehold on the policymaking apparatus. Yang suggests that the international regime is paving the way for a limited government in China, something the political elites probably do not intend. 50 Further, accession to global norms may also create tensions within the ruling elite, as those who favor reform and openness face those 11 who are entrenched in the traditional hierarchy and oppose foreign interference in state decisionmaking. 51 Perhaps the most challenging aspect of China’s entry into the WTO will be its effect on the domestic economy. While it is widely believed that WTO-accession will be good for China in the long term, Solinger and others have suggested that short-term restructuring could be devastating for China’s urban state-enterprise sector. She argues that up to 40 million urban workers will lose their jobs thanks to China’s entry in the WTO. 52 The implications on state society relations of such widespread unemployment could be disastrous. It will take dramatic governance reform for the CCP to smooth the transition to international organizations like the WTO. If this governance reform fails, the legitimacy of the state would certainly begin to look suspect.
China’s economy won’t collapse and even if they did, the government would intervene


This spring and early summer were full of reports that China’s economy — and the dangerous political clout that comes with it — were ebbing. Some were even predicting that the Dragon Economy would collapse altogether and that it would take the world with it in its spiral toward oblivion. But despite these predictions of an economic doomsday, things are looking up this month. Manufacturing surged to 51.7, indeed, rising faster than it has in the past two years. The purchasing managers index (PMI) hit 51.7 last month — the best since April 2012. Any number above 50 indicates growth; but the larger picture shows more than growth; it shows momentum. The main reason for this bump comes in the form of government policy, from boosting spending on railways and social housing to tax breaks for small enterprises. Yes, China’s “Protect the Eight” is now “Protect the 7.5”, but it’s to be expected. Small things like China’s first bond default back in March caused a bit of mild suspicion and panic; in reality, China was just letting the market do what it does (onlookers can be forgiven for not recognizing this rare sight). Companies are learning their lessons and running from the Chinese “Debt Trap” in unusual ways, and the race to create a consumer culture is taking hold. Gordon G. Chang’s infamous and now proven incorrect book The Coming Collapse of China — a favorite whipping boy for pro-China nationalists — included very real worries, positing that China’s sluggish state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and bogus loans would wreak havoc in five to ten years. That was in 2001 — 13 years later “the coming collapse” still hasn’t arrived. In short, whether people are baffled by China’s numbers, angry over the effect China is having on their countries, or just fed up with the Communist Party’s grandstanding and human rights violations, their concerns haven’t translated to economic failure. Of course, the lynchpin of the supposed collapse is the Chinese housing market. Fear of shadow banking, unregulated and sometimes unreasonable construction, and the outright cost of all this development (all legitimate worries) has had many wondering when the Chinese housing market is going to collapse and take world markets with it. However, China’s housing market simply defies prediction and common sense. Supposed bubble burst after bubble burst, the market remains reliable. And this is due in no small part to the tightening and loosening of government policy. Chang has been at the head of the housing doomsday brigade, and there’s nothing really wrong with that; pointing to systemic flaws is important. But catastrophic collapse does seem increasingly unlikely. On housing, the government knows it’s in a bit of a pickle — they have to keep building because it makes up such a large portion of the GDP but building could cause the bubble to finally burst big time. It’s true, China has built too much, but the likely reality is that prices for properties and construction will drop, which will keep China away from the constant predictions of a doomsday scenario. And it did look like doomsday to some. But today, the doomsday predictions for China seem more and more like wishful thinking. While the numbers may point in the direction of worst case scenario, China’s authoritarian government is always quick to act. Back in May, when people were worried the bubble had already burst, Matt O’Brien commented in The Washington Post: “Hopefully, the rest of the world won’t catch a cold when China sneezes — and it will only be a sneeze.” Yes, a real housing market crash would be potentially catastrophic for China and the rest of the world, but that’s assuming the authorities will twiddle their thumbs as the economy collapses and that systemic failure is more probable than sustainable, predetermined solutions.
AT: G20 Solves Growth

G20 Not Linked to Financial Growth


In this paper we have dealt with the question of whether G20 summits have been influential for global financial markets. While the output legitimacy of the G20 should not be judged based on its capacity to steer global financial markets, especially in the short term, the financial market reaction may be considered as a useful indicator of the information and hence decision content of G20 summits. If the G20 summits contribute to reaching consensus on key decisions in global cooperation and financial regulation, it should follow that summits represent important news for financial markets and should be relected in market prices and volatilities. In particular, our paper follows the tradition of events studies and analyses the impact of the G20 meetings at both ministerial and Leaders level on a set of financial market prices. We cover equity returns (total market and banking sector), bond markets, as well as equity implied volatility and higher moments of market prices such as skewness and kurtosis, to also capture the effect on asymmetry and tail risks. Studying the impact on volatility is also useful in order to understand whether the G20 has been a stabilising force on markets in times of crisis. We look not only at the timing of the G20 meetings, but also at other characteristics such as, in particular, the press reaction to G20 meetings, building on a quantitative measure of the press reception of each G20 meeting similar to the one used by Lucca and Trebbi (2009) for the press reaction of FOMC meetings. The big picture arising from the empirical analysis is that, with a couple of exceptions, effects of G20 summits are small, short-lived, non-systematic and non-robust across specifications and assets. We also find that characteristics of the statements released after the meetings and of the press reception likewise do not have a consistent effect on markets.
APEC Reverses Economic and Climate Progress


Ahead the kickoff this week of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Manila, Philippines, social movements, labor unions, indigenous groups, farmer organizations, and international activists are mobilized to protest the two-day annual meeting of global economic leaders. But why are so many in the Philippines and around the world angered by APEC economic development and what are the reasons to protest the 2015 APEC Summit? 1. Over the years, APEC economic development has worsened poverty and inequality while strengthening corporate power. APEC pushes free trade, deregulation, and privatization in the name of building economies in the Asia-Pacific region. But the claimed benefits of neoliberal globalization promoted by APEC have been empty promises for poor and working people. While APEC economies swell and transnational corporations reap major profits, the purported trickle-down of wealth and increased opportunities for those who need them most has never been realized. Poverty, inequality, and misery haven’t decreased as promised—they have increased. In the Philippines, for example, years of structural adjustment and trade liberalization have ravaged the country’s agricultural sector, undermined economic diversity and created a service economy, and contributed to the massive out-migrations of tens of thousands of Filipinos each year in the face of a domestic economy crippled by unemployment and low wages. “Only the big nations are reaping the rewards of globalization under APEC, not the Philippines,” said Teddy Casino, a leader of the People’s Campaign Against APEC and Imperialist Globalization and former member of Philippine Congress. After years of unequal development, groups in the Philippines and beyond have united to reject more of the same policies that have destined so many to poverty and marginalization. “This week’s cries of ‘No!’ are voices telling us of an alternative truth,” wrote Casino. “They are the voices of ordinary people searching and struggling for a truly better world.” 2. APEC listens and responds to corporate interests, not to the needs of workers, farmers, and indigenous people. As APEC leaders meet with global corporate shakers in the annual APEC CEO Summit from Nov. 16-18, the demands of the Philippines’ indigenous people and working class continue to fall on deaf ears. Lumad indigenous people of the Philippines are among those that the Philippine government aims to silence while cozying up to corporate giants during the CEO Summit leading up to the official leaders summit later this week. The country has heightened security with increased police and military presence to control protesters and respond to possible security breaches. Activists have urged the government not to crack down on free speech in the name of security. The Lumad have marched on the capital Manila, where the summit takes place, since last week to protest transnational mining corporations and resource extraction in the country threatening indigenous communities. “It’s appalling that our own government is much more willing to listen to foreign investors in the Apec summit,” said Datu Jomorito Goaynon, spokesperson of the Lumad protest known as Manilakbayan. According to the International League of Peoples’ Struggle of the Philippines, mining and militarization has displaced over 40,000 Lumad people and killed at least 76 since President Benigno Aquino III came to office in 2013. 3. Poor and homeless people are being detained in the name of “cleaning up” Manila for APEC. As the Philippines aims to put its best foot forward and show off its developmental gains to visiting APEC leaders, Manila’s poor and homeless—among the global losers of APEC policies—have been rounded up and taken out of sight and out of mind ahead of the summit. At least 20,000 homeless people have been removed from the streets of Manila in the name of “cleaning up” the city ahead of the summit. Road closures across the city have put the chaotic city into a tranquil state for arriving world leaders while creating transit challenges for locals. Ver imagen en Twitter Local ABS-CBN News reported Saturday that a group of homeless people had been taken to a government-run orphanage in the Manila suburb of Marikina City. Interviewees told the news network that they had been tricked into being pent-up in the facility and that more homeless people were being brought in despite the lack of food provided to those already there for several nights. Over 140 street children have been rounded up in what the government calls “rescue operations” in the week leading up to APEC. Hundreds more adults have also been swept out of the streets, hiding the visible consequences of unequal economic development. 4. APEC economic doctrine promotes resource exploitation and environmental destruction. While APEC 2014 put climate change in the spotlight, many of the bloc’s economic policies have had negative impacts on the environment and threaten to worsen climate change. Trade deregulation promoted by APEC has enabled massive corporate sell-offs of land and increased the ease with which transnational corporations can exploit resources and open mining concessions around the world, often with grave environmental impacts for local communities who don’t see any economic benefits from the projects. In the Philippines for example, mining corporations, mostly from Australia and Canada have been granted massive permits for millions of hectares of land to extract minerals and precious metals. Ver imagen en Twitter “We all know this means further
poverty, destruction of the environment and incessant militarization in areas where resistance against
development aggression flourish,” said Lumad spokesperson Datu Jomorito Goaynon. In 2014, APEC member nations pledged to
double the share of renewable energy in APEC’s overall energy mix by 2030. But it remains to be seen whether the bloc will go far enough to
help make sure the planet stays below the 2 degrees warming that scientists say is the breaking point that could end human life as we know it.
5. The cost of the APEC Summit is huge, and Filipino people will bear the brunt of it. The Philippine government has allotted a budget of over
US$200 million (10 billion Philippine pesos) for the summit, a huge amount for a country whose GDP just topped US$330 billion. What’s more,
total costs to the economy will be considerably as a result of the government shutting down factories and declaring national holidays and
canceling over 1,000 flights to avoid airport congestion during the summit. The Metro Manila area, where the goal of making a good impression
for global leaders is bringing the city to a halt, accounts for about 37 percent of the country’s total GDP. Even a couple days’ slowdown will have
a big economic impact. Importantly, though, many workers in Manila who get paid by the day will be hard hit by two days of national holidays
forcing them not to work, especially those who live hand to mouth, as is the case for many daily-wage workers who don’t get paid on holidays.
As Francisco Tatad asked in a Manila Times op-ed, “Should a sizable number go to bed without food, just because they were laid off their daily
work by the great economic summit?”
Neg – Modernization Advantage
1NC – No China War

No risk of U.S.-China conflict – too economically dangerous, and China knows it won’t win.


Of course, Xi Jinping has no interest in triggering armed conflict with the U.S., a nightmare scenario that would fundamentally undermine China’s economic rise. Furthermore, there are few, if any, credible military scenarios in the immediate period ahead in which China could militarily prevail in a direct conflict with the U.S. This explains Xi’s determination to oversee the professionalization and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a credible, war-fighting and war-winning machine. Xi Jinping is an intelligent consumer of strategic literature and would have concluded that risking any premature military engagement with the U.S. would be foolish. Traditional Chinese strategic thinking is unequivocal in its advice not to engage an enemy unless you are in a position of overwhelming strength. Under Xi, the ultimate purpose of China’s military expansion and modernization is not to inflict defeat on the U.S., but to deter the U.S. Navy from intervening in China’s immediate periphery by creating sufficient doubt in the minds of American strategists as to their ability to prevail.

No nuke war – rational actors and mutually assured destruction


Next year will be the seventieth anniversary of the end of the last global conflict. There have been points on that timeline — such as the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and a Soviet computer malfunction in 1983 that erroneously suggested that the U.S. had attacked, and perhaps even the Kosovo War in 1999 — when a global conflict was a real possibility. Yet today — in the shadow of a flare up which some are calling a new Cold War between Russia and the U.S. — I believe the threat of World War III has almost faded into nothingness. That is, the probability of a world war is the lowest it has been in decades, and perhaps the lowest it has ever been since the dawn of modernity. This is certainly a view that current data supports. Steven Pinker’s studies into the decline of violence reveal that deaths from war have fallen and fallen since World War II. But we should not just assume that the past is an accurate guide to the future. Instead, we must look at the factors which have led to the reduction in war and try to conclude whether the decrease in war is sustainable. So what’s changed? Well, the first big change after the last world war was the arrival of mutually assured destruction. It’s no coincidence that the end of the last global war coincided with the invention of atomic weapons. The possibility of complete annihilation provided a huge disincentive to launching and expanding total wars. Instead, the great powers now fight proxy wars like Vietnam and Afghanistan (the 1980 version, that is), rather than letting their rivalries expand into full-on, globe-spanning struggles against each other. Sure, accidents could happen, but the possibility is incredibly remote. More importantly, nobody in power wants to be the cause of Armageddon.
1NC Concessions Fail

China doesn’t know fiat is durable – as long as we have BMD assets or ASB, they won’t trust us—their author

Nicholas Khoo, senior lecturer @ Atago and Reuben Steff, lecturer @ Waikato, 2014, “This program will not be a threat to them: Ballistic Missile Defense and US Relations with Russia and China,” http://www.otago.ac.nz/politics/otago077523.pdf

US BMD and China during the Obama Administration The Obama Administration’s policy on BMD has extended to China and, more specifically, its sphere of influence, the Asia-Pacific. Here, a serious complicating factor in the USA–China relationship has been US BMD assistance to its allies in Asia. Although the USA has sought to reassure China that BMD will pose no threat to its security, its actions suggest otherwise to the Chinese. These include expanding and deepening BMD in its incarnation as Theater Missile Defense (TMD) cooperation with its East Asian allies Japan and South Korea, and discussion of integrating these systems into America’s global system. These developments are not entirely new, and were highlighted as early as China’s 2000 Defense White Paper.49 Since the August 1999 USA–Japan agreement to conduct joint research on TMD,50 Japan has fielded three destroyers with Aegis BMD and a number of Lockheed Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) systems. An X-band early-warning radar was stationed in Aomori Prefecture in Northern Japan in 2006. Washington and Tokyo agreed in August 2012 to station a second X-band radar in Japan.51 These capabilities will inherently have the capability to counter Chinese missiles and monitor Chinese territory. The aforementioned BMDR also identified South Korea as a priority for increased BMD cooperation, and Seoul deployed its second Aegis destroyer in June 2012 to buttress its PAC-2 capabilities, creating a two-tier system.52 In the same month, Seoul and Washington committed a bilateral Korean Air and BMD system which Seoul has stated is solely intended to cover the Korean Peninsula.53 China is invariably concerned that this co-operation can be incorporated into a region-wide system. Luo Zhaohui, Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, commented in April 2012 that US efforts in building a regional missile defense system “will have negative effects on global and regional stability.” 54 Recent comments by US officials also suggest this to be the case.55 Even if the current US strategy is not intended to target China, China simply cannot assume that this situation will not change in the future. China would be myopic not to believe that these developments cannot be targeted at it. As Steven Hildreth of the US Congressional Research Service has explained: “The focus of our rhetoric is North Korea. The reality is that we’re also looking longer-term at the elephant in the room, which is China.” 56 He commented that these efforts were “laying the foundations” for a region-wide BMD system that will incorporate Japan, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan.57 Putting it succinctly, one senior US official stated that “physics is physics ... . You’re either blocking North Korea and China or you’re not blocking either of them.” 58 A number of Chinese experts and official news outlets have criticized this growing cooperation, arguing that it has already emboldened Japan in its territorial disputes with China.59 Indeed Shi Yinhong, Professor of International Studies at Renmin University in Beijing, has stated that “the joint missile system objectively encourages Japan to keep an aggressive position in the Diaoyu Islands dispute, which sends China a very negative message. Japan would not have been so aggressive without the support and actions of the US.” Of concern from a Chinese perspective, BMD cooperation between Washington and its East Asian allies can be expected to increase, as part of the Obama Administration’s rebalancing policy. A 2012 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, commissioned by the Defense Department, makes clear that
America and its allies “must demonstrate a readiness and capacity to fight and win, even under more challenging circumstances associated with Anti-Access Area-Denial (A2AD).” The report noted that China’s capabilities in “areas such as the East, Philippines, and South China seas” could soon “pose a significant potential military threat to the United States and allies and partners.” Towards this end, it states that “US forward deployed forces and allied forces could benefit from additional missile defense capabilities – both batteries and reloads.” Specifically, it notes that increasing investments in THAAD and PAC-3 systems are essential to hedge “against uncertainties regarding longer-term Chinese intentions.” The report also recommends that both Japan and South Korea increase their BMD investments. It further observes that Japan is “eager for greater dialogue with the United States on the emerging US AirSea Battle concept,” and that increasing US–Japanese inter-operability, which has been “driven by BMD requirements,” has “essentially created a joint command relationship between the United States and Japan from the perspective of any possible adversary.” Rounding out its BMD recommendations, the report calls for “full Australian participation in US theater BMD, including an Australian decision to equip its new air warfare destroyers with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) missiles.”

China responds The task of all military planners is to plan for worse-case scenarios, and like Russia a key Chinese fear is US military encirclement. BMD is viewed by the Chinese as a critical aspect of any such US strategy. For example, Chinese Air force Colonel Dai Xu stated that BMD was becoming the “technological glue” for ensuring US pre-eminence, forming a “missile blockade” in East Asia, underpinning what he views as a neo-containment strategy of China.67 A China Daily opinion piece posited that “the ring begins in Japan, stretches through nations in the South China Sea to India, and ends in Afghanistan. Washington’s deployment of anti-missile systems around China’s periphery forms a crescent-shaped encirclement.”68 Looking around the region, the Chinese could be excused for making such an interpretation. In the context of the Obama Administration’s late 2011 “pivot” (later re-branded as a “rebalance”) even moderate voices in China such as that of Professor Zhu Feng of Peking University see US policy as targeting China.69 It can be argued that this is a misperception on China’s part, even while seeing how the Chinese might think this way. Given the foregoing, the Chinese reaction to the Obama Administration’s BMD program and its regional incarnation was, therefore, predictable. They began to adopt a posture of hard internal balancing against US BMD. Like the Russians, they did so in two ways. This included: (1) the fielding of new strategic and conventional weapons equipped with BMD countermeasures and (2) changes made to China’s military doctrine. In terms of new strategic and conventional weapons, as early as February 2009, the second month of Obama’s Administration, Qing Zhiyuan, Commander of China’s Strategic Missile Force, called for further improvements and expansion of China’s nuclear deterrent. He stated that the arsenal “is now at a new historical starting point” and “will evolve onto much higher levels.”70 The subsequent 2009 Perry–Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission stated that “China may already be increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its assessment of the US BMD program,” and was being accompanied by a shift to sea-based and land-based mobile systems to increase its second-strike potential.71 As the research of a variety of specialists has argued, US BMD has now become China’s central referent point for its own nuclear weapons program.72 China’s People’s Liberation Army clearly desires to maintain a capability to penetrate US BMD systems following a US first strike, and is determined to strengthen its second strike forces, effectively balancing the USA in the nuclear realm. In fact, a major study of China’s nuclear capabilities has found that Chinese strategists are confident that they can overwhelm US BMD systems.73 In any case, a shift in Chinese strategy has been underway for some time, from a posture of minimal deterrence, which only provided assured retaliation, to one that that would allow assured destruction.
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China recognized this, stating that “China is also currently working on a range of technologies to attempt to counter US and other militaries’ ballistic BMD systems, including maneuvring re-entry vehicles [MIRVs], decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.” 75 As noted in its 2012 report, this trend has continued.76 More recently, reports estimate that the number of Chinese ICBM missiles capable of hitting the US mainland is less than 50 but will probably double by 2025.77 However, this projection is conservative in light of Qing Zhiyuan’s statement above and the trajectory of China’s nuclear efforts outlined in subsequent paragraphs. Indeed, China is making strides on various fronts. It successfully conducted a missile interception test on January 2010 and tested a stealth aircraft in January 2011.78 There is further evidence that hard internal balancing is occurring against USA’ BMD. China is developing a new nuclear bomber.79 Meanwhile, research has intensified on improvements to China’s long-standing road-mobile ICBM, the DF-41, which can contain up to 10 warheads, giving China the ability to increase the annual growth rate of missiles capable of hitting America from double to triple digits.80 The DF-41 is China’s first MIRV-capable missile and equipped with improved countermeasures to penetrate US BMD systems.81 In August 2012, China reportedly tested a fourth new MIRVed submarine-launched ICBM, the JL-2.82 Major General Zhu Chenghu of China’s National Defense University tied the above developments to American BMD, stating that BMD “reduce[d] the credibility of its [Beijing’s] nuclear deterrence.” 83 Deployment of BMD countermeasures has become a significant element of China’s nuclear balancing effort, as every new ICBM is equipped with this capability. The recent announcement by the Obama Administration of a new strategic concept known as Air Sea Battle (ASB)84 appears to confirm Chinese fears, even if it is also a US response to China’s deployment of A2/AD capabilities. ASB is intended to maintain US freedom of action in A2/AD environments. For example, a recent Department of Defense report titled Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense includes “improving BMDs” under the heading “Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges.” 85 Tellingly, a senior Obama Administration official confirmed with Bill Gertz of The Washington Times that: “Air Sea Battle is to China what the maritime strategy was to the Soviet Union ... It is a very forward-deployed, assertive strategy that says we will not sit back and be punished ... We will initiate.”86 ASB foresees a future US–Chinese conflict fought with long-range precision weaponry over vast distances in which Navy Aegis ships supplement other BMD assets across the Pacific. Escalation pressures would easily arise in such a conflict in which intra-war deterrence and BMD would play a pivotal role. Viewing all this activity, the Chinese have to assume the worst. Thus, with an air of inevitability, as Professor Sun Zhe of Tsinghua University recently noted, “We have again and again said that we will not be the first country to use nuclear force ... We need to be able to defend ourselves, and our main threat, I’m afraid, comes from the United States.” The second prong of China’s hard balancing response to US BMD has involved changes to its military doctrine. While China’s basic view of nuclear weapons since 1964 has been consistent with nuclear deterrence, the fact remains that it was not until 2006 that it formally accepted deterrence as a doctrine.88 In its 2006 Defense White Paper, it was explicitly stated that the “fundamental goal” of the Second Artillery (which is the designated unit in charge of China’s nuclear forces) is “to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China ... it endeavours to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent.” 89 At the same time, while China has held a policy of No First Use (NFU) since its acquisition of a nuclear capability in 1964, its endorsement no longer appears to be unqualified. Recent research has documented instances of Chinese officials signaling that China’s long-held NFU policy could be altered and/or the threshold for a nuclear response lowered during a regional crisis.90 A second change
in military doctrine relates to the increasingly problematic intertwining of conventional and nuclear forces in China’s view of deterrence. A strong strand in Chinese strategic thinking has been an emphasis on conventional weapons in bolstering nuclear deterrence. As China’s nuclear doctrine evolved, China’s leader at the time, Jiang Zemin (1989–2002), viewed conventional and nuclear weapons as “combining multiple means” to strengthen deterrence. Under Hu Jintao (2002–2012), the doctrine was further adjusted to reflect a streamlining of China’s nuclear and conventional capabilities. The so-called “three doubles” concept was developed. Accordingly, China sought to achieve “double (nuclear and conventional) deterrence, double (nuclear and conventional) operations, and double (nuclear and conventional) command.” A more recent component was Hu’s March 2012 emphasis on “systems confrontation” with potential enemies. However, it is the “third double” command that raises troubling questions in a crisis scenario. As Lewis and Xue note: the basic dilemma stems from the deployment of two types of missiles on the same Second Artillery bases with fundamentally different capabilities and purposes. In the practice of double deterrence and double operations, the nuclear missiles’ essential mission is to deter a nuclear first strike on China, and they are only to be used in extremis. However, at the same time, the conventional weapons on the formerly all-nuclear bases must be ready to strike first and hard. The foregoing is particularly troubling since it blurs the line between conventional and nuclear warfare.
2NC Concessions Fail

Assuaging concerns over BMD insufficient – Chinese modernization is based on the perception of US intent – aff can’t change that

Saalman 13

[02/05/13, Dr. Lora Saalman is an Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, “Placing a Renminbi Sign on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Reductions”, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/05/placing-renminbi-sign-on-strategic-stability-and-nuclear-reductions/fo9k]

However, lest it be assumed that simply assuaging Chinese concerns over ballistic missile defense will be enough to mitigate overall misgivings about the path of nuclear disarmament, the majority of writings on the subject continue to place their focus squarely on U.S. conventional weapons advances and strategic advantage (zhuanjue youshi). As one Chinese expert put it: In September 2009, as China’s national chairman Hu Jintao at the United Nations Security Council’s Association for Disarmament and Nonproliferation has already expressed, other nuclear weapon states will enter into international nuclear reductions at an appropriate time. Because this is not based on amount, under the condition that the United States continues to maintain conventional advantage and is building global ballistic missile defense, the two countries will not have much in common. While BMD and CPGS are part of the discourse, they remain just two manifestations of a perceived overall U.S. intent to maintain its “absolute advantage” (juedui youshi), “absolute security” (juedui anquan), and “absolute hegemony” (juedui baquan). Even U.S. attempts at nonproliferation and counterproliferation meet with frequent assertions that the United States seeks to “protect its hegemonic position” (weihu qi baquan diwei). So while Obama’s championing of disarmament has received some positive acknowledgement by Chinese scholars, criticisms of U.S. hegemony continue. Because of Chinese skepticism about nuclear disarmament and the perception of relative stasis at the nuclear level, conventional systems and future U.S. advances writ large are at the core of Chinese concerns. (See Figure 9-2.) Consequently, the United States has misplaced its focus on China’s potential “race to parity.” Rather, conventional arms racing should be the paramount concern. Chinese experts remain intent on how the United States intends to maintain its dominance, and possibly even increase it with the removal of the nuclear option. Despite Chinese experts’ arguments to the contrary, to prevent this from occurring, China’s dependence on nuclear deterrence has become even greater than that of the United States.

Defunct programs still freak out China – they view relations holistically and not through any individual programs

Saalman 13

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Experts within China are still committed to retaliation or “striking back” (fanji) in the face of provocation, and this will be likely to drive China’s conventional and strategic warhead numbers, force structure, and deployment. As such, U.S. strategic planners need to be aware of the potential deleterious
China does what it wants and only talks behind closed doors- won’t listen to US


THE Chinese government often tolerates, and even encourages, abuses of power and extrajudicial punishments by law enforcement officials. These are the underlying evils that sustain a regime that values its own preservation above all else, including human rights and the rule of law. But how is this possible in a world where outsiders feel free to criticize China’s human rights record? Why does the Chinese government respond to some forms of protest, while sternly ignoring others? The answer can be found in the way the Chinese leaders, at all levels, think about their authority, their reputations and their power. Consider the case of Chen Guangcheng, a human rights advocate who has been under house arrest with his family in Shandong Province. Recently, the public received news that his 6-year-old daughter would be allowed to leave the house to attend school, a concession that seemed to signal more lenient treatment. But then, on Oct. 23, a group of Internet activists who had set out to visit him were brutally attacked by a local mob. Witnesses who described the attack on the Internet said it appeared to have been well planned — a sign that Mr. Chen’s ordeal was not yet over. Why won’t the authorities simply let Mr. Chen and his family go? The most critical reason is mianzi, or “face,” as it is usually translated in English. The authorities know that what they have been doing is unjust and illegal. But they saw the gathering of activists as an affront, and responded harshly because the government could not afford to lose face — which would undermine its power in the public’s eyes. Petty cruelties and crackdowns are everyday occurrences in today’s China. Officials, especially low-level ones, have never cultivated respect for the rule of law, due process or habeas corpus. If they were held accountable for strictly following the law in all cases, most would probably lose their jobs, bringing the state apparatus at the local level to a halt and endangering the system of government control. That is why, even though the powerful know what lesser officials do, they usually turn a blind eye — as long as they can cover up the misdeeds and the public doesn’t become outraged. When public outrage does ensue, another mechanism of control — intervention by senior officials — sometimes occurs. That happened in September 2010 after a man set himself on fire to protest a building demolition in Jiangxi Province. High-level leaders fired a party boss and mayor for negligence. But the case of Mr. Chen evidently didn’t qualify for such intervention, because another rule of power in China came into play: Never seem to bend to the demands of foreign powers. In such cases, it is the central government that digs in its heels, and the louder the outcry grows, the worse the situation becomes. In the government’s eyes, there is a stark difference between a homegrown problem like the one in Jiangxi and a case like Mr. Chen’s, in which the government perceives foreign meddling. Congress has passed an amendment expressing support for Mr. Chen, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton recently criticized his house arrest in a speech. China saw these developments as an intolerable imbalance, in power is especially sensitive to the development of U.S. BMD, CPGS, and other advanced conventional systems.17 While these programs are real enough, even their specter has a real impact on Chinese perceptions. Longdefunct U.S. programs continue to emerge in Chinese experts’ discussions as evidence of U.S. intent, such as the robust nuclear earth penetrator and the reliable replacement warhead.18 The shelf life of these programs in Chinese discourse suggests that old assumptions about U.S. intent and the potential for nuclear coercion continue to play a profound role in the Chinese strategic psyche. 1

consequences of using a rigid and outdated strategic stability model, when those in China view such relations holistically and as being linked to comprehensive national power. This balance, or rather imbalance, in power is especially sensitive to the development of U.S. BMD, CPGS, and other advanced conventional systems.17 While these programs are real enough, even their specter has a real impact on Chinese perceptions. Longdefunct U.S. programs continue to emerge in Chinese experts’ discussions as evidence of U.S. intent, such as the robust nuclear earth penetrator and the reliable replacement warhead.18 The shelf life of these programs in Chinese discourse suggests that old assumptions about U.S. intent and the potential for nuclear coercion continue to play a profound role in the Chinese strategic psyche. 1

Americans, if you grant me face, I can be reasonable; if solving the problem will help me, I’ll consider it. But don’t expect me to make concessions under pressure. Such concessions would call into question the regime’s legitimacy. And once the issue is survival, the government is in effect cornered, leaving it no choice but to resort to drastic measures from which nothing — sense, humanity or law — can dissuade it. The problem turns into one of “sovereignty,” which in the Chinese government’s vocabulary means the absolute, non-negotiable right to rule over a billion subjects. When sovereignty is in play, there is no longer a right or wrong side of an issue, just winning or losing. A similar logic was involved 22 years ago at Tiananmen Square. The protesters there asked for nothing more than dialogue, but the government stubbornly refused because it didn’t want to set a precedent. To Chinese leaders, “governing” means absolute control. Allowing the people to become a rival to the government might bring down the system. The same is true in Mr. Chen’s case, but with an important difference: in 1989, the government refused to set a precedent of yielding to popular demand at home. Today it refuses to set a precedent of yielding to American
pressure. China and the United States have been discussing human rights issues for so many years that it is baffling that American leaders remain so clueless about the Chinese government’s mind-set. Previous high-profile cases were resolved behind the scenes. Mr. Chen’s case should have been approached this way, too — not through public pressure. I welcome American politicians’ concerns about China’s human rights situation. But I have one request: please be a bit more considerate, a bit more flexible, and a bit more tactful about our leaders’ mind-set. That way, you — and we — might have more success.

China has never been transparent with their military- no chance that they will now


The People’s Liberation Army does not have a website. There is China Military Online, which boasts that it’s “approved by the Central Military Commission,” (CMC) the 11-member body chaired by Chinese President Xi Jinping, which oversees the PLA, and is the military’s “only news portal website.” There are other Chinese news sites, like Chinamil, which hosts Liberation Daily, a newspaper put out by the PLA’s general political department, the shadowy department tasked with running the army’s political activities. And there’s a website for China’s Ministry of National Defense, an organ which is subordinate to the CMC, and which is nominally the public face of the PLA. But the world’s largest standing army, and the CMC which oversees it, has decided not to bother. On March 5, during an annual meeting of its legislature, Beijing announced that it is increasing its military budget by 12.2 percent, to a total of $131.6 billion in 2014. While still less than a third of the $496 billion that Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel proposed in February for the U.S. military in 2015, it still represents a significant expansion, even after two decades of double-digit growth in the PLA’s official budget. But few doubt that the grand total allocated to China’s military is yet higher, and many in the U.S. government wish they had more insight into the method to the darkness surrounding the PLA. **There is general consensus that China, like many nations, spends more on its military than it reports**: In February, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency said that China’s military budget reached $240 billion in 2013, according to Bloomberg. As the most salient data point of China’s military, **Beijing’s official budget gets a lot of attention. And that’s largely because there’s little other information that comes with it.** “The single number, without any accompanying detail, represents the sum total of public transparency by the world’s second-largest defence spender and the fastest rising military power, pored over by intelligence agencies and military experts from around the world in an effort to glean any clues about China’s future strategic intentions,” reported the Financial Times. So how opaque is the PLA, and how much insight and information does the United States possess? It’s important to distinguish between what the general public and the media understands, and classified information on the PLA available to U.S. government officials. “There’s a big difference between what you know and what we know,” said a senior Pentagon official, who asked to speak on background because of the sensitivity of the matter. The United States has long worried about the Chinese military’s lack of openness. “They mock us some times, for how much we repeat” this call for a higher level of transparency, said the senior Pentagon official. Most recently, Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., the commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, expressed concerns about the “aggressive” growth of the Chinese military and “their lack of transparency” in a February speech. Overall, though, the Chinese military is probably growing more transparent; or at least the United States’ non-classified understanding of it is improving. On a February trip to Beijing, the Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond T. Odierno said the two countries’ military planners were planning to start a formal dialogue and exchange program before the end of 2014. “We know a lot about China’s defense budget, especially when compared to a decade ago,” said a China military researcher, who asked to speak on background. Part of the reason, he said, is the proliferation of open source material. While the PLA might not have a website, it does support a media industry whose role, just like in the United States, is to explain and critique it. There are countless newspapers, blogs, and military journals in China that regularly run articles about the Chinese military and what it should or should not be doing. “Technically our understanding of China’s military has improved over the last five to ten years, and we have a decent sense” about intelligence, said a U.S. defense official, who asked to speak anonymously. The military itself does seem to have taken steps to make itself better understood to domestic audiences and foreign governments. In November, seven units of the PLA and China’s paramilitary People’s Armed Police appointed spokespeople. (Prior to that, a single spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense fielded comments for the PLA.) Not much has changed: six of the spokespeople wrote New Year’s greetings, which The PLA Daily newspaper dutifully published on its Sina Weibo account, and at least two of the spokespeople have, since being named, actually made public addresses. The PLA has made itself more open “in very small increments,” said Avery Goldstein, director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China at the University of Pennsylvania. They’re starting to publish with more frequency “things like defense white papers” and other reports, he said. The biggest hole in U.S. understanding of the Chinese military appears to be in how it makes decisions. “We are still pretty much in the dark” about decision-making, both in terms of personnel and other areas, said the U.S. defense official, a sentiment widely shared by others interviewed for this article. “We have pretty much zero insight into how the PLA makes decisions,” said the military researcher. “Zero.” When asked about how much control Xi has over the PLA — perhaps the most important question if a crisis were to occur — the senior Pentagon official paused for a minute, before replying: **Nobody knows what Xi’s control over the PLA is.**” On one level, being able to control what information it releases benefits the PLA. “It’s calculated,” said
Goldstein. "The Chinese don’t want to reveal too much that exposes weaknesses." The PLA, he notes, realizes that it’s weaker than the U.S. military. They often say, "if you have a gun and I have a knife, transparency does not make me safer," said Dean Cheng, a scholar at the Heritage Foundation. Misinformation, and the selective release of information, plays a bigger role in Chinese tactics than it does in the United States. "Mao Zedong said warfare is 70 percent political," said a former U.S. defense official with extensive experience in Beijing, who asked to speak on background. He cited the concept of san zhan, or three warfares: psychological, media, and legal. "From the Chinese perspective, political warfare, including legal warfare, is seen as a form of combat," Cheng wrote in a May 2012 article. But the opacity also raises concerns about the intentions of the Chinese military. "They flat out refuse to put limits on what they may do!" said the senior Pentagon official. "There are interminable meetings, where we say, ‘How many submarines? Are you going to build a lot of anti-satellite weapons? 100? Five?’ Anything that would possibly jeopardize U.S. forces, we’d like to know about. But they flat refuse to say anything at all about the limit or future size of the force they might build." "Go straight to hell" is their attitude." That has consequences both in the Pentagon, and repercussions back in Beijing. "Do you think when the Chinese speak this way to an [American] admiral or general, the admiral just takes a sip of tea? No! It makes them paranoid," he said. "The secrecy turns into inadvertent provocation for U.S. defense hawks to spend more on the rebalance" — the U.S. policy of moving forces toward the Asia-Pacific region. "I hate to say it, but [the PLA] have brought this onto themselves." It’s not only foreigners who are kept in the dark. “One of the biggest discoveries of the last 10 years is that the PLA doesn’t share with the civilian leadership,” said the senior Pentagon official. Indeed, an editorial announcing the institution of PLA spokespeople in the Global Times, a Communist Party newspaper, politely offered suggestions for making the PLA more open: “They could also create an ‘Open Barracks’ day for some troops garrisoned in cities. "Is there a Chinese doctrine on military space? How does the military command? If there is a crisis, who do we call. We just don’t know," Cheng said. The key questions are the unknown unknowns in a time of potential crisis. If there is a major, unannounced build-up of China’s military, said the senior Pentagon official, “then not knowing is a disaster.”

US has asked the PLA to become more transparent but there are too many benefits for them to maintain militaristic transparency- the plan doesn’t solve any of these


One of the oft-heard complaints leveled against China’s military modernization is that it lacks transparency. The U.S., in particular, has persistently called for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to embrace greater transparency, in light of various surprises such as the first flight test of the J-20 stealth fighter while U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates was in Beijing, or the more recent hypersonic missile test. It is indeed worth asking why China isn’t more transparent when it comes to its military. On the surface, there are a number of compelling reasons for the PLA to be less opaque. To begin with, by demonstrating military prowess, China would be better able to deter its adversaries. And deterrence after all is China’s stated rationale for modernizing its military. Moreover, there are strong domestic motivations for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to showcase its military achievements. Specifically, highlighting military achievements plays well with nationalistic domestic audiences, and helps advance the CCP’s argument that it is rejuvenating the nation. In fact, the CCP does often seek to highlight the PLA’s modernization for this very reason. It would seem that greater transparency would only bolster this effect. The fact that the PLA is nonetheless rather opaque suggests that there are countervailing forces that outweigh these benefits. It’s impossible to know with any degree of certainty what exactly these are, but there are a number of possibilities. One such possibility, which seems to be Robert Gates’ favorite, is that the PLA operates with a large degree of autonomy from the CCP leadership. If the PLA does enjoy a high degree of autonomy, it may resist transparency for a number of reasons. First, many
foreign analysts maintain that PLA officers are far more hawkish than other leaders in China. In fact, some go so far as to claim that certain factions in the PLA believe the U.S. and China should fight a war. To the extent this is true, the PLA may not be interested in the enhanced deterrence effects that transparency could bring. Moreover, the PLA brass would presumably be far less interested in using its own achievements to bolster the CCP’s nationalist credentials. Finally, opaqueness could be useful to China’s military brass in so far as greater scrutiny could reveal large-scale corruption, particularly among the officer corps. Another possibility is that China resists transparency because it fears that foreign nations would use this transparency to weaken China’s defenses. After all, giving foreign militaries and intelligence agencies greater access to its military hardware would presumably allow them to devise better ways to defeat it in battle. The same goes for doctrine. A related (and the most dangerous) possibility is that China resists greater transparency because it has a military doctrine that relies on the element of surprise to be effective. The strategic doctrines that rely on the element of surprise, of course, tend to be offensive in nature. Steven Van Evera, among others, has warned of the dangers of doctrines that rely on first-move advantages. In describing the five dangerous effects of first-move advantage, Van Evera argues that the greatest danger is “the concealment of grievances, capabilities, plans, and perceptions.” He goes on to explain: “In a world of first-move advantage, states conceal their military capabilities to preserve their capacity to strike by surprise. At a minimum they conceal their strengths; at a maximum they actively feign weakness.” The same can be said of military doctrines that rely on first-move advantage. Notably, China does have a history of using first-move advantage military doctrines, as it did when intervening in the Korean War and again in its border war with India in 1962. A final possibility, however, is that China opposes greater transparency because its military capabilities are not as great as they generally perceived. In this scenario, China prefers opaqueness because greater transparency would allow opposing militaries to gain a greater understanding of what Chinese troops and hardware are capable of. If, as many have suggested, PLA troops struggle to properly operate their more advanced platforms, Beijing has an interest in concealing this fact in order to preserve deterrence. Similarly, if the military hardware itself is much less capable than it appears from the outside, China would again have an interest in hiding this reality from potential adversaries. I tend to believe that this last possibility is probably the most likely. However, as noted above, it is impossible to know the truth with any degree of certainty. This is what makes military opaqueness potentially so dangerous, as a lack of knowledge allows potential adversaries to come to a host of very different conclusions.
Chinese modernization is inevitable – they’re developing it to be revisionist, not out of vulnerability


China is currently engaged in a deep and sustained nuclear weapons modernization program. There is considerable debate among American observers about the meaning of this process. Many observers believe China is upgrading systems so as to maintain survivability in the face of American nuclear superiority and possibly conventional counterforce operations. They argue the modernization does not change fundamental aspects of China’s nuclear weapons employment policy, nor does it provide China capabilities that would yield political leverage. However, the breadth and scope of Chinese nuclear modernization gives one pause. While it is impossible to thoroughly comprehend China’s nuclear policy because of a lack of transparency, it is possible to analyze those systems that directly or indirectly support China’s nuclear arsenal. When examined in this way, it appears that China may be moving toward significant changes in force structure and nuclear employment policy. This paper examines some of the key qualitative and quantitative improvements to China’s nuclear forces over the last 15 years as well as projected changes. It argues that there is an alternate narrative to understanding China’s nuclear modernization process. It concludes that there is ample evidence to support a revisionist view of China’s modernization: that China is either engaged in, or laying the groundwork for, a more transformative buildup and a concomitant change toward a more assertive nuclear strategy. This alternate narrative sees China modernizing with a goal to create an arsenal that is useful for political coercion, early use, and possibly parity with the US and Russia. At the least, China is creating an infrastructure that will support continued growth and possibly a breakout in terms of delivery systems, warheads, and support capabilities. This argument is at odds with much of the current analysis of China’s nuclear weapons program.
Chinese nuclear weapons modernization is based in hegemonic goals – their evidence is eurocentric and biased


The reasons for China upgrading its nuclear forces are subject to debate. The argument here is that, at least in part, it is the intention of the PRC to become a global hegemon and as such it requires a large and capable nuclear force. Others see different PRC motivations. For example, there remains historical distrust of the United States (perhaps rightfully so). Indeed, scholars have concluded ‘no country had been closer than the PRC to suffering a nuclear attack since Hiroshima and Nagasaki’,20 It is not surprising then, that China might demand a robust nuclear force. Another argument that discounts especially the notion that nuclear forces support China’s intention to challenge the US is that the Chinese are simply attempting to build more survivable nuclear forces. This mainstream view asserts that the ‘drivers of China’s future nuclear strategy have two main attributes: they are principally linked to advances in US military capabilities (as opposed to those of other nations) and to US strategic defense and conventional strike capabilities in addition to the United States’ nuclear forces’.21 Many also argue the pace of Chinese nuclear modernization is slow and thus not a reason of concern for (or response by) the United States. They note that the PRC has seldom deployed much in the way of operational strategic forces. ‘The pace and scope of nuclear modernization is consistent with longstanding Chinese leadership beliefs about pursuing deterrence through assured retaliation.’22 Those who discount worry about nuclear modernization in China note that the growth in PRC nuclear forces ‘has been strikingly slow in relation to the nuclear arsenals of its adversaries’.23 While this was true in the past, today only China is enlarging its nuclear forces among the P-5. Furthermore, the modernization is not linked only to numbers, or certain delivery systems, or anything else – we are witnessing an across the board enhancement of strategic capabilities. Finally, past reluctance to modernize may be attributed to situation specific factors such as economic limitations, exceptionally large arsenals in the US and the USSR that China could not hope to match, a bipolar conflict that effectively relegated China to secondary status, and the desire to leapfrog technologies until China could reach the current generation or better. Those who see Chinese modernization as more benign counter that China has been economically empowered for some time now. ‘Even as the financial resources allocated to China’s armed forces have increased rapidly over the past two decades, nuclear modernization has been gradual and measured.’24 One might hasten, it has been designed not to elicit alarm. There are at least two problems with the sort of analysis that sees Chinese nuclear weapons modernization as benign. First, it is profoundly Western-centric. Many thinkers in the West seem to have reached a ‘post-modern’ view of nuclear weapons that asserts the weapons have no utility. It is not clear that thinkers outside the West have reached the same conclusion. Indeed, quantitative analysis questions this view as well.25 Second, it is based on straight-line projections. ‘because the PRC has not expanded its nuclear arsenal noticeably in the past, it will not do so in the future’. This is a dangerous form of analysis. It also discounts that we have left a bipolar world, that China previously was a second or third rate power, that China does not wish to alarm the US, and that China is becoming a hegemonic challenger. These factors make such straight-line projections inappropriate. Instead of focusing on what happened in the past, sound analysis should focus on the present and future: we see broad and deep improvements in the quality of Chinese nuclear forces. We are apparently seeing larger numbers of delivery systems; unless China is retiring old systems one-for-one as it fields new systems. We have seen a massive increase in the number of missiles assigned to the
Second Artillery Corps. While it is true that many of these new missiles are conventional, most are also dual-use, and at least some are nuclear. Still, many want to focus on the past as an accurate guide to the future. ‘China has remained focused on developing a secure second-strike capability by improving the reliability, survivability, and penetrability of its nuclear arsenal.’ Therefore, the argument goes, strategy has not changed. But this may be an incomplete understanding of China’s modernization process. China has also moved toward MIRVs (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles) and faster response times. The Science of the Second Artillery Campaigns, widely circulated to demonstrate the nonthreatening nature of Chinese nuclear modernization, also calls for a ‘reduction of the time that the Second Artillery requires to respond to attack.’ Other sources underline the ‘importance of warhead miniaturization, penetration, and accuracy as other elements of effectiveness’. These improvements are also elements of a nascent warfighting capability. Such a strategy would emphasize the abilities to strike quickly (response times), to put more warheads on a missile (miniaturization and MIRVs) so as to enhance first strike capability, and to improve the ability to attack silos (accuracy). Additionally, there is little doubt that China is fielding more strategic (and other) nuclear capable missiles. PRC open sources note the ‘appropriately increasing number of missiles’. Though many of these may be conventionally armed, it would be imprudent to assume none are nuclear armed. China is also engaged in R&D on warfighting capabilities such as penetration capabilities. This provides greater capabilities than needed to meet a US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system of 30 interceptors designed to counter North Korean missiles. ‘China is also currently working on a range of technologies to attempt to counter US and other countries’ ballistic missile defense systems, including maneuvering re-entry vehicles, MIRVs, decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.’

While this can be viewed as motivated by BMD, it just as well represents an increase in warfighting capability. Although China’s forces that can reach the US have grown slowly, they have grown steadily since the 1990s and, if viewed in terms of percentages, they have grown meaningfully. ‘By the early 1990s, China reportedly possessed only four DF-5s. Even then, China’s ICBM force grew only to twenty missiles by the mid-to-late 1990s.’ This ‘modest’ growth (of 500 percent) means the difference in an ability to hold four cities at risk or 20 cities. Each DF-31A, each JL-2, and each DF-41 will hold one or more additional US cities at risk. These trends, then, deserve closer examination. The remainder of this article reviews nuclear modernization in three key areas: delivery systems, warhead development, and anti-ballistic missile (ASAT) weapons.

BMD is irrelevant – China’s modernization has exceeded what they’d need for assured retaliation


Summary of Modernization and Impact

Certainly this is a plausible narrative. But another plausible narrative exists. To wit, if China is so focused on not entering an expensive arms race as is part of the benign narrative, why continue to modernize past the point of assured retaliation? By most accounts, China has reached this point. Moreover, if China’s arsenal has effectively become invulnerable, China has little to gain by continued opacity. In fact, such opacity could cause an end to US nuclear arms reductions as well as Russian reductions. This lack of transparency generates distrust and anxiety among neighbors. It might even cause proliferation in states such as Japan and South Korea. There is little to be lost for China by improved transparency now. Unless China is developing the tools to eventually support a hegemonic challenge, first in the western Pacific and later internation-ally. This eventual move to great power status, and to hegemon, seems to have a nuclear element. Hegemonic transitions are characterized by multiple great power crises. As Matthew Kroenig notes, states with more nuclear weapons are more likely to prevail in crises. China’s President seems to recognize the importance of nuclear weapons. ‘The Second Artillery Corps is the core force of our country’s strategic deterrent, it is a strategic pillar of our great power status, and an important bedrock for protecting our national security,’ Mr. Xi said. This narrative, too, is plausible. Such a narrative does not rely on a 1,000 or 2,500 war-head force today. Rather, it lays the groundwork for such an expansion, probably slowly, covertly, but steadily. It is consistent with Deng’s philosophy of keeping a low profile:
'observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capabilities and bide out time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership'.121 Thus it is useful to look again at PRC nuclear weapon modernization. Some of this, it could be argued, is in response to US BMD R&D. ’In response to missile defense programs in the United States and other countries, the Second Artillery is researching and developing a variety of technologies to defeat such systems, including maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs), multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and ASAT weapons.’122 These developments are themselves destabilizing, but do not themselves necessarily indicate a fundamental change in China’s nuclear policy. But PRC modernization appears responsive to more than just BMD. The expansion is also about enhancing survivability, which again alone is not unreasonable. ’US DOD suggests China is moving a larger fraction of its warheads to relatively more survivable delivery systems such as solid-fueled missiles.’123 China fears for its delivery systems’ survivability due to US CCC.124 So then, improved penetration ability and enhanced survivability both make sense as responses to US technological developments. At the same time, China has not taken measures that would have maintained or enhanced stability, such as clearly delineating nuclear from conventional missiles. The Second Artillery controls a wide variety of delivery platforms, many of which are dual use.125 Yet, China has apparently deliberately conflated the two, thereby complicating US intelligence and operations, while increasing the likelihood of unintended or uncon-trolled nuclear escalation. This implies China is willing to introduce nuclear weapons into crisis calculations, which indicates it believes nuclear weapons have use beyond the accepted post-modern Western views (i.e., that nuclear weapons are only useful to deter their use by oth- ers). The trust deficit and concomitant burden to reduce the deficit has arguably shifted to China as a result.
2NC Modernization Inev—Great Wall

Their theory of Chinese motivations can’t explain nuclear developments outside the cherry picked examples of the advantage—great wall policy proves its to boost warfighting


Great Wall Project (GWP)

Developments in China’s nuclear weapons program that enhance war-fighting potential are not limited to offensive options. Defensively, the PRC has steadily expanded its warfighting infrastructure. The most obvious (and public) such expansion has been the ‘Great Wall Project’ (GWP) or ‘Underground Great Wall.’ Popularized by Professor Phillip Karber’s students at Georgetown University, the GWP has been years in the making and appears only through the first of three stages. The project is actually a number of projects all focused on enhancing survivability, but seemingly far more extensive than necessary to enhance the survivability of a 240–300 warhead nuclear force. China has a long history of tunneling for security. Kristensen, Norris, and McKenzie point out that, ‘a rule of thumb seems to be that if the base is near a mountain, then there likely will be some form of underground facility’.104 However, the GWP appears far more developed than necessary for China’s nuclear arsenal, at least the conventional underestimating of the arsenal. Most reports put the tunnel system at some 5,000 km long. These are not thought to be all interconnected however. Rather, it is likely that the ‘Great Wall Project’ does not refer to specific projects, but to a series of relatively new underground facilities built to conceal and protect missiles and other strategic assets of the Second Artillery.’105 It was begun in 1985 and the first phase finished in ‘about ten years.’106 The tunnels do not appear designed simply to conceal, but seem designed to absorb nuclear strikes and provide protection for assets. The tunnels of the underground great wall are hundreds of meters under-ground, deep in mountain areas, and are difficult to detect from space. Details of the tunnels have not been publicized for obvious security reasons, but it is know that they are scattered across China... They are designed to withstand nuclear and conventional attacks. Rail lines and trucks move missiles and related equipment.107 These facilities could be viewed as evidence of NFU and a willingness to absorb a nuclear strike. Or they may demonstrate the ability to wage protracted nuclear conflict or threaten credibly to wage such conflict.

Open sources indicate the tunnels are quite advanced. “Based on official images of the “GreatWall Project”, the underground tunnels have sufficient room for land-mobile and locomotive missile vehicles to travel freely...”108 There is little doubt that the tunnels enhance the survivability of China’s nuclear forces. Experts estimate that “a single large yield nuclear warhead is unable to destroy the facilities by a direct hit” and... “state- ments in a China Defense News report that “the facilities can only be destroyed under repeated strike at the same point by a number of nuclear penetrators of hundreds of kilotons yield”.”109 The tunnels also make conventional counterforce operations challenging. ‘Even if China’s tunnels are covered simply by hundreds of meters of wet earth, not by granite as is reported, they seem relatively safe from repeated strikes by conventional precision-guided weapons.”110 It is believed that China has based older missiles such as the DF-3s and DF-4s in the tunnels.111 But given the extent of the tunnels, and especially if this is only phase one of a three phase project, mobile mis-siles could also be based underground, except while out of garrison. In addition to survivability, this might provide PRC authoritarians elite a sense of greater control over Chinese nuclear weapons. There is even some evidence of ongoing research into ‘an underground mobile launch system’.112 It is likely that Chinese command and control (C2) facilities are also being moved underground.113 Of course, survivable C2 is necessary for NFU, but only in its most basic form. Complex C2 is necessary for warfighting. The tunnels appear to provide survivability for more extensive and complex C2. The tunnels raise questions. Many have suggested the tunnels are designed simply to improve survivability for China’s nuclear forces.114 There is no doubt that the tunnels do this. But as Karber asked (and was roundly mocked for asking), ‘Why 5,000 km of tunnels for 240 weapons?’115 Indeed, if China wants to avoid the expense of a large nuclear buildup, why waste money on a 5,000 km project with two follow on phases? Though some see the ability to launch from tunnels as supporting NFU, it also enhances warfighting potential. It also provides the infrastructure to base a much larger force. Finally, China also bases its SSBNs underground with underwater entrances. It is not clear how much this approach improves survivability. The tunnel
entrances themselves may be vulnerable to attack, thereby trapping the SSBNs if they have not flushed. One thing is clear, however. China does not appreciate the United States Navy in the area. The USNS Impeccable was harassed by China in 2009 in international waters near Hainan Province, probably on an intelligence mission regarding a submarine base.
Mainstream analysis of China’s nuclear weapons program suffers from weaknesses, some inherent in the endeavor and some adopted intentionally by analysts. An example of a weakness inherent in the effort is China’s lack of transparency. China has released very little information about its program. It has never revealed anything near what the other P-5 (permanent nuclear powers) have revealed. We do not know how many intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) China has, we do not know how many warheads it has or has produced, and we know little about the characteristics of the warheads. We do not know how much weapons grade material (WGM) China has produced or expended over the years. We do not know if warheads are currently deployed on or off delivery systems. Indeed, we are not even certain whether China has ceased producing WGM. We think we know some of this information, but too many analysts seem to take the guesswork of others and impute reality to this guesswork. The lack of information is endemic to analyzing China’s nuclear weapons program. But many analysts compound this opacity by making Western-centric assumptions about China’s program. For example, among many Western analysts there seems an assumption that Chinese policymakers have reached the same conclusions as Westerners regarding the disutility of nuclear weapons. To wit, nuclear weapons are only useful to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others. This may be a profound mistake. There is evidence in the literature that Chinese decisionmakers believe nuclear weapons have utility for political coercion. If this is the case, then assumptions about the needed size and makeup of the arsenal, as well as national goals, demand reexamining. Indeed, when one sets these assumptions aside, one is struck by the aggressive expansion of quality and quantity within the program, leading to alternate conclusions about China’s capabilities and possible employment policy. This paper operates from a less Western-centric understanding of nuclear weapons and proposes an alternative narrative of current developments in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) nuclear weapons program. Specifically, this paper examines a variety of modernization indicators including the aforementioned ongoing increase in quality and quantity of weapons systems and support systems; increases in the survivability of China’s nuclear weapons; and warfighting capabilities. Individually, these indices can be explained away as responsive to US capabilities. Such explanations allow analysts to maintain the popular narrative of a small arsenal operated under ‘no first use’ (NFU) principles. But when viewed in the aggregate, there is a strong argument that China is either engaged in, or laying the infrastructure for, a significant nuclear buildup and concomitant change in employment policy to one of early or possibly first use.
2NC Modernization Inev—Tech

Technology drives doctrine not the other way around – China will abandon minimum deterrence


Again, it is not surprising that the PLA seeks such capabilities, but neither is it consistent with a limited role for nuclear weapons. Moreover, technology in some sense pushes doctrine, and as the Second Artillery acquires new technology it should be expected to expand doctrine. “Military technological innovation inevitably optimizes military organization structure and command systems, pushes the transformation of operational methods, changes military management models and methods, and pro-motes the development of military theory.”129 As more DF-31As become available, as more capable SSBNs become available, and when a MIRVed DF-41 becomes available, doctrine will adjust, most likely toward greater utility for nuclear weapons. This is most troublesome because a hegemonic transition looms in the medium to long term. Gao is arguing that China will eventually abandon minimum deterrence in favor of more assertive policy and supported by a more capable force structure. PRC modernization today may be the first step in that direction. For the future, a number of points are germane. First, the notion that China’s warhead capacity has not grown and will not grow appreciably may be wrong.136 The fact is we have little idea about current warhead numbers (and less than we might like to think about highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium production). But we do know every-thing else surrounding the warheads is growing. Second, the idea that modernization is only to achieve a secure second-strike capability may be incomplete.137 Mainstream thinking dismisses any explanation for modernization other than enhanced survivability or enhanced conventional capabilities. Such a conclusion is rife with Western-centric assumptions about nuclear weapons being unusable and serving no purpose but to deter their use by others. These analysts acknowledge that: some increase in the number of nuclear warheads should be expected with the introduction of new missile systems, such as the DF-31A and DF-31 along with its submarine-launched variant. However, the absence of a clear signal of nuclear warhead growth and expansion of missile infrastructure could indicate an extension of Second Artillery’s conventional mission.138 The appreciation of some warhead growth is laudable; the expectation of some ‘clear signal’ of further growth may be unfounded. There is no log-ically necessary reason to believe China’s arsenal will stay at 240–300 just because it has in the past. First, this is straight-line projection and therefore suspect. Second, China’s rise to the world’s dominant economic power strongly suggests its nuclear forces will grow to reflect this reality. I can think of no example of a power growing to have the world’s largest economy where a proportional military did not eventually follow. With so little transparency surrounding PRC nuclear weapons, analysts should be more circumspect. Other explanations are plausible. Those who argue that no or little growth will occur are forced to deal with the clear quantitative and qualitative expansion of delivery systems and support systems. They point out that missile growth does not neces-sarily equal warhead growth. ‘Despite a significant expansion of Second Artillery’s missile brigade infrastructure over the last 15 to 20 years, a review of China’s nuclear warhead storage and handling system offers no obvious signs of significant increases in China’s nuclear stockpile.’139 Yet it is unclear why such an expansion should be obvious, given China’s his-tory of opaqueness. Instead, Occam’s razor would have us offer the explanation with the fewest assumptions necessary – large-scale modernization in terms of quality and quantity of delivery systems should augur in favor of larger nuclear forces. This is not to say China seeks nuclear superiority. It is to say China’s modernization may not be as benign as generally interpreted, and that we should not be surprised to see large-scale expansion at some point in the future. Nevertheless, the standard view is that China will continue to main- tain small force levels. ‘Regarding force structure, China so far has avoided massive increases in size and instead has sought to improve sur-vivability through mobility, enhanced concealment, and some increases in force size.’140 This may or may not be accurate. We cannot reach this con-
clusion with assuredness. We do not have any evidence and China refuses to provide proof. Even if it is the case that China is not engaged in a buildup and change in strategy, it may be laying the groundwork for such a change. It is not clear how much longer China will follow the current set of rules. Whichever the case, we should expect continued upgrading of forces, generation by generation, leapfrogging obsolete technologies. This leapfrogging approach makes the best of limited resources and a nonthreatening security environment. But the leapfrogging approach may be reaching the end of necessity. Perhaps in this generation of weapons, or more likely in the next, China may be expected to develop significant forces. Such forces may support a more assertive employment policy, including but not limited to, early use and warfighting.
Mobile capabilities already exist

OSD, 15 – Office of the Secretary of Defense (“ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015”)

Second Artillery Force. The Second Artillery Force controls China’s land-based nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles. It is developing and testing several new classes and variants of offensive missiles, including hypersonic glide vehicles; forming additional missile units; upgrading older missile systems; and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. The Second Artillery Force possesses at least 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) in its inventory. China is increasing the lethality of its conventional missile force by fielding a new ballistic missile, the CSS-11 (DF-16), which possesses a range of 800-1,000 km. The CSS-11, coupled with the already deployed conventional variant of the CSS-5 (DF-21) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), will improve China’s ability to strike not only Taiwan, but other regional targets. China is fielding a growing number of conventionally armed MRBMs, including the CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The CSS-5 Mod 5, with a range of 1,500 km and maneuverable warhead, gives the PLA the capability to attack ships in the western Pacific Ocean. The Second Artillery continues to modernize its nuclear forces by enhancing its silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and adding more survivable, mobile delivery systems. China’s ICBM arsenal currently consists of 50-60 ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 and multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)-equipped Mod 3 (DF-5); the solidfueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 1 and 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and the shorter range CSS-3 (DF-4). The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of 11,200 km, can reach most locations within the continental United States. China also is developing a new road-mobile ICBM, the CSS-X-20 (DF-41), possibly capable of carrying MIRVs. The PLA Navy places a high priority on the modernization of its submarine force and currently possesses 5 nuclear attack submarines (SSN), 4 nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), and 53 diesel attack submarines (SS/SSP). By 2020, this force will likely grow to between 69 and 78 submarines. In addition to the twelve KILO SS acquired from Russia in the 1990s and 2000s, China has built 13 SONG SS (Type 039) and 13 YUAN air independent-powered (AIP) attack submarines (SSP – Type 039A) with a total of 20 YUAN SSP planned for production. China continues to improve its SSN force, and four additional SHANG SSN (Type 093) will eventually join the two already in service. The SHANG SSN will replace the aging HAN SSN (Type 091). Over the next decade, China may construct a new Type 095 nuclear powered, guided-missile attack submarine (SSBN), which not only would improve the PLA Navy's anti-surface warfare capability, but might also provide it with a more clandestine, land-attack option. Finally, China continues to produce the JIN SSBN (Type 094) with associated CSS-NX-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that has an estimated range of 7,400 km. This capability represents China’s first credible, sea-based nuclear deterrent. China will likely conduct its first SSBN nuclear deterrence patrol sometime in 2015. Four JIN-class SSBNs are currently operational, and up to five may enter service before China begins developing and fielding its next-generation SSBN, the Type 096, over the coming decade.

SSBN program will stay limited – aren’t perceived as strategically useful

Cunningham and Fravel 15

[October 17, 2015, Fiona S. Cunningham is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, M. Taylor Fravel is Associate Professor of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability”, International Security, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Fall 2015), pp. 7–50]
China’s desire to defeat U.S. ballistic missile defenses creates a strong rationale for the SSBN program. Nevertheless, strategic, technological, operational, and organizational hurdles prevent a sea-based deterrent from becoming China’s most survivable nuclear delivery system even if they soon start deterrent patrols. Chinese perceptions of the SSBN force are mixed. On the one hand, it is viewed as strengthening China’s deterrent by increasing survivability and penetrating missile defenses. As the Science of Military Strategy explains, "Faced with the objective situation of the United States and countries on China’s periphery actively developing missile defenses, developing China’s sea-based deterrent force is significant for the reliability, credibility, and effectiveness of protecting China’s nuclear deterrent and counterstrike." Although the launch trajectories of SLBMs can be used to overcome missile defenses, many interlocutors acknowledged the vulnerability of China’s SSBNs to U.S. and Japanese antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. One interlocutor noted that, because of their vulnerability, SSBNs would add nothing to China’s deterrent and that several more decades of development were needed for Chinese SSBNs to be sufficiently quiet underwater. Such concerns reflect long-standing debates within China about the advantages of SSBNs for survivability and penetrability, and the disadvantage of vulnerability to hostile ASW. As the Science of Military Strategy explains, China’s current SSBN force “has significant shortcomings in terms of both scale and quality, compared to developed countries.” Furthermore, the navy “should speed up its research and development of new type strategic nuclear submarines to form a sea-based nuclear counterattack combat capability with a certain scale (yiding guimo).”
Zhao evidence concedes there are plenty of non-LOW reasons for China to be getting early warning

Tong Zhao is an associate in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. He was previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow with the Managing the Atom Project and the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. “Strategic Warning and China’s Nuclear Posture,” May 28, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/strategic-warning-and-chinas-nuclear-posture/

On the other hand, it is also possible that China’s interest in strategic early warning is driven by its interest in obtaining some missile defense capability rather than by a desire to shift to a launch-on-warning posture. China has conducted a few missile defense tests and will likely seek to deploy such technologies in the future. An early warning system is necessary for the development and deployment of missile defense, and writings by many Chinese strategic and technical experts attest to their interest in building an early warning capability for China’s future missile defense system. There is yet another possibility: that the “strategic early warning” in the white paper actually refers to strategic warning in a general sense, i.e., strategic warning based on assessments of an enemy’s military mobilization and war preparation activities. That makes sense because military tensions take time to build up – an “out of the blue” surprise strike during peacetime is very unlikely. If this is what China refers to in the white paper, it means China has yet to formally commit to a full-blown program of building space- and land-based early warning systems. In any case, many analysts in China seem to support the idea that China should have some early warning capabilities, although the exact nature, size, scale, and purpose of such early warning capabilities have not been thoroughly examined. China seems – quite sensibly – to be developing this capability in a gradualist manner – starting from short-range detection systems and, if that goes well, perhaps gradually moving to the development of long-range strategic early warning capabilities. So ultimately China will face the question of what kind of strategic early warning capability it needs for its nuclear forces; and if it decides to develop a full strategic early warning system, whether it serves China’s interests to shift to a launch-on-warning posture. It will require good strategic planning to make the right decision on these very important security issues.